At his inauguration in January 2009, President Obama argued that military power could not in itself secure US interests: just as important as ‘missiles and tanks’ were the convictions which motivated his country, as well as the capacity to show ‘humility and restraint’ in its dealings with others. In its first few months the Obama Administration has shown an intelligent engagement with the complexities of international security.
The nuclear weapons agenda is certainly full: the fate of the Fissile Material (Cut-off) Treaty; US negotiations with Russia over further nuclear warhead reductions; the implementation of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty; and the 2010 Review Conference of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). It is a daunting agenda. Will Russia prove to be a constructive partner in its negotiations with the US, or will it insist upon concessions which Obama will not be able to accept? How can the growing demand for nuclear energy be met, while ensuring that nuclear weapons materials and technology are not spread yet more widely? Is the long-standing taboo against nuclear weapon use in a state of terminal decay, with some countries and non-state groups keen to acquire a nuclear capability in order to make use of it militarily? How can the acquisition and use of nuclear weapons in this way be deterred successfully and durably?
The purpose of these initiatives is open to question. Is the goal to contain hostile relationships along the lines of the Cold War? Is it to protect the interests of the established nuclear weapon states by maintaining discriminatory agreements? Or is the aim the lasting achievement of a nuclear disarmed world? Twenty-first century nuclear weapons control is a hybrid of all of these, combining disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control. It is never going to be easy to explain and implement. Yet its broad purpose ought to be clear: the prevention of nuclear war. Governments must be open-minded as to the best combination of means to adopt. Test bans, verification, weapon-free zones, the cut-off convention, counter-proliferation, threat reduction and even the nuclear weapon ‘global zero’ should be evaluated as instruments rather than venerated as ends in themselves. Politics and diplomacy must come before weapons and technology. President Truman once warned against becoming "so preoccupied with weapons that we lose sight of the fact that war itself is the real villain."
Treaties on the agenda
The Fissile Material (Cut-off) Treaty
The FMCT is a proposed treaty, designed to outlaw the production of fissile material for weapons purposes. It is currently being negotiated in Geneva.
The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
The CTBT bans all nuclear explosions in all environments. The UN General Assembly adopted the treaty in 1996. At present, the US, China, India, Israel and Pakistan need to ratify the treaty before it can enter into force. It is widely assumed that US ratification will occur sometime next year, after which China will follow suit.
The 2010 Review Conference of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
The 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty is reviewed every five years. The last review conference, held in 2005, was considered a failure because nothing was agreed. The next conference, in 2010, is expected to tackle difficult questions including Iran’s nuclear programme and the right to develop ‘peaceful’ nuclear energy.
Dr Paul Cornish, Carrington Professor of International Security, Chatham House