BECOMING INVOLVED IN TERRORISM
Understanding the process of becoming a terrorist may help us to develop counter-terrorism tactics, says Dr John Horgan
Why does one person become involved in terrorism and another not? This is a very difficult question to answer but there are a series of predisposing risk factors, which include:
> Personal experiences of victimisation (which can be real or imagined)
> Expectations about involvement (eg the lures – excitement, mission, sense of purpose) associated with being involved in any ‘insider’ group
> Identification with a cause, frequently associated with some victimised community
> Socialisation through friends or family
> Opportunity for expression of interest and steps towards involvement
> Access to the relevant group
Individually none of these factors explains why people become terrorists but, taken in combination, they do provide a framework for understanding why one person might become involved in terrorism.
Avenues for counter-terrorism
How people move between different roles within terrorist organisations is poorly understood. Becoming involved in terrorism is a complex process, made up of discrete phases in a gradual process of accommodation and assimilation. In other words, there is a sense of gradual movement into, through (and sometimes out of) different roles and functions.
Some individuals appear to become involved more quickly than others, but a constant quality across all terrorist movements is gradual progression.The notion of there being a ‘moment of epiphany’ that explains some assumed conscious decision to become a terrorist is both naïve, misleading and unsupported by empirical evidence.
Terrorism will always be a product of its own time and place, and multiple motivations will co-exist for members of even the same movement. However, the most obvious common denominator influencing individuals’ embracing of their own radicalisation (at any level) towards a terrorist movement is a sense of positive expectation.
The terrorist mind
We do not engage in behaviour unless we view it as having some distinct benefit to us - the same applies to the terrorist. Sometimes that might be expressed in terms of expectations about achieving a sense of status, authority, acceptance, mission, and so forth.
As long as commitment and dedication to one’s socialisation further and further into the movement remains positive for the follower, this eventually results in the formation of a new (or at least, effectively consolidated) identity.
If we want to appreciate what, if anything, is the ‘terrorist mind’, it is probably best thought of as the product of the increased socialisation into a terrorist movement and engagement in illegal activity and behaviour that is increasingly relevant to the context of a terrorist movement.
From a personal and social perspective, this often means that a socialisation into terrorism, and those associated with it, sees a socialisation away from non-‘relevant’ friends, family and the person’s former life.
One of several consequences of distinguishing between these phases is that we might begin to develop phase-specific counter-terrorism initiatives, depending on what we ascertain is the most effective intervention point. For example, we need to understand whether we should be aiming to prevent initial involvement, disrupt subsequent engagement, or help to facilitate disengagement.
The disengagement phase
Although the disengagement phase remains the most poorly understood and least researched, I would argue that it is during this phase that practical counter-terrorism initiatives aimed at both facilitating disengagement and preventing involvement are more likely to succeed.
Terrorism is ultimately a group activity and that group will always comprise individuals who each have a role to play in the movement. Current counter-terrorism programmes don’t tend to focus on individuals. However, in my view, it is by understanding individual radicalisation, and its associated social and psychological qualities, that we can get a sense of the dynamics we need to understand in order to develop ways of promoting disengagement*.
Dr John Horgan is Senior Research Fellow at the Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence. He is also a Lecturer in International Relations at the University of St Andrews. Prior to this appointment, he was a Lecturer in Forensic Psychology at University College Cork
* Work on this issue has begun at the University of St Andrews and will be published in 2008. See Horgan J, ‘Walking away from Terrorism: Accounts of Disengagement from Radical and Extremist Movements’ (New York: Routledge, In press)
Dr Sandra Bell is Director of Homeland Security and Resilience at The Royal United Services Institute. Visit: www.rusi.org for more information
